A long-running difficulty with conventional game theory has been how to modify it to accommodate the bounded rationality of all real-world players. A recurring issue in statistical physics is how best to approximate joint probability distributions with decoupled (and therefore far more tractable) distributions. This paper shows that the same information theoretic mathematical structure, known as Product Distribution (PD) theory, addresses both issues. In this, PD theory not only provides a principled formulation of bounded rationality and a set of new types of mean field theory in statistical physics. It also shows that those topics are fundamentally one and the same.
I. INTRODUCTION
In noncooperative game theory, one has a set of N players, each choosing its strategy x i independently, by sampling a distribution q i (x i ) over those strategies. Each player i also has her own utility function g i (x), specifying how much reward she gets for every possible jointstrategy x of all N players. Let q (i) (x (i) ) mean the joint probability distribution of all players other than i, i.e., j =i q j (x j ). Then the "goal" of each player i is to set q i to so that, conditioned on q (i) , the expected value of i's utility is as high as possible.
Conventional game theory assumes each player i is "fully rational", able to solve for that optimal q i , and that she then uses that distribution. It is primarily concerned with analyzing the such equilibria of the game [3, 4, 5, 6] . In the real world, this assumption of full rationality almost never holds, whether the players are humans, animals, or computational agents [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15] . This is due to the cost of computation of that optimal distribution, if nothing else. This real-world bounded rationality is one of the major impediments to applying conventional game theory in the real world. This paper shows how Shannon's information theory [16, 17, 18] provides a principled way to modify conventional game theory to accommodate bounded rationality. This is done by following information theory's prescription that, given only partial knowledge concerning the distributions the players are using, we should use the Maximum Entropy (Maxent) principle to infer those distributions. Doing so results in the principle that the bounded rational equilibrium is the minimizer of a certain set of coupled Lagrangian functions of the joint distribution, q(x) = i q i (x i ). This mathematical structure is a special instance of Product Distribution (PD) theory [11, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23] .
In addition to showing how to formulate bounded rationality, PD theory provides many other advantages to game theory. Its formulation of bounded rationality explicitly includes a term that, in light of information theory, is naturally interpreted as a cost of computation. PD theory also seamlessly accommodates multiple utility functions per player. It also provides many powerful techniques for finding (bounded rational) equilibria, and helps address the issue of multiple equilibria. Another advantage is that by changing the coordinates of the underlying space of joint moves x, the same mathematics describes a type of bounded rational cooperative game theory, in which the moves of the players are transformed into contracts they all offer one another.
Perhaps the most succinct and principled way of deriving statistical physics is as the application of the Maxent principle. In this formulation, the problem of statistical physics is cast as how best to infer the probability distribution over a system's states when one's prior knowledge consists purely of the expectation values of certain functions of the system's state [18, 24] . For example, this prescription says we should infer that the probability distribution p governing the system is the Boltzmann distribution when our prior knowledge is the system's expected energy. This is known as the "canonical ensemble". Other ensembles arise when other expectation values are added to one's prior knowledge. In particular, if the number of particles in the system is uncertain, but one knows its expectation value, one arrives at the "grand canonical ensemble".
One major difficulty with working with these ensembles is that under them the particles of the system are statistically coupled with one another. For high-dimensional systems, this can make statistical physics calculations very difficult. Accordingly, a large body of work has been produced under the rubric of Mean Field (MF) theory, in which the ensemble is approximated with a distribution in which the particles are independent [25] . In an MF approximation, a product distribution q governs the joint state of the particles -just as a product distribution governs the joint strategy of the players in a game.
MF approximations are usually derived in an ad hoc manner. The principled way to derive a MF approxima-tion (or any other kind) to a particular ensemble is to specify a distance measure saying how close two probability distributions are, and then solve for the q that is closest to the distribution being approximated, p. To do this one needs to specify the distance measure. How best to measure distances between probability distributions is a topic of ongoing controversy and research [26] . The most common way to do so is with the infinite limit log likelihood of data being generated by one distribution but misattributed to have come from the other. This is known as the Kullback-Leibler (KL) distance [16, 17, 27] . It is far from being a metric. In particular, it is not symmetric under interchange of the two distributions being compared.
It turns out that the simplest MF theories minimize the KL distance from q to p. However it can be argued it is the KL distance from p to q that is the most appropriate measure, not the KL distance from q to p. Using that distance, the optimal q is a new kind of approximation not usually considered in statistical physics.
For the canonical ensemble, the type of KL distance arising in simple MF theories turns out to be identical to the maxent Lagrangian arising in bounded rational game theory. This shows how bounded rational (independent) players are formally identical to the particles in the MF approximation to the canonical ensemble. Under this identification, the moves of the players play the roles of the states of the particles, and particle energies are translated into player utilities. The coordinate transformations which in game theory result in cooperative games are, in statistical physics, techniques for more allowing the canonical ensemble to be more accurately approximated with a product distribution.
This identification raises the potential of transferring some of the powerful mathematical techniques that have been developed in the statistical physics community to the analysis of noncooperative game theory. In also suggests translating some of the other ensembles of statistical physics to game theory, in addition to the canonical ensemble. As an example, in the grand canonical ensemble the number of particles is variable, which, after a MF approximation, corresponds to having a variable number of players in game theory. Among other applications, this provides us with a new framework for analyzing games in evolutionary scenarios, different from evolutionary game theory.
In the next section noncooperative game theory and information theory are cursorily reviewed. Then bounded rational game theory is derived, and its many advantages are discussed. The following section starts with a cursory review of the information-theoretic derivation of statistical physics. After that is a discussion of the two kinds of KL distance and the MF theories they induce, and a discussion of coordinate systems. This section also includes a discussion on translating a MF version of the grand canonical ensemble into a new kind of evolutionary game theory.
As discussed in the physics section, the maxent Lagrangian and associated Boltzmann solution at the core of this paper has been investigated for an extremely long time in the context of many-particle systems. Considered in the context of a 2-player game with nature, the Boltzmann solution has also been studied for many years in the reinforcement learning community [28, 29] . Related work has considered it in the context of "mechanism design" of many players, i.e., in the context of designing the utility functions of the players to induce them to maximize social welfare [30, 31, 32, 33] . It turns out that independent of the work reported in this paper, the maxent Lagrangian and its Boltzmann solution has been been muted in the context of game theory [10, 34, 35] . However its motivation in that work is somewhat ad hoc. In that work there is no use of information theory nor discussion of the relation between bounded rational game theory and mean field theory. There is also no relation of the maxent Lagrangian to the cost of computation, multiple cost functions, rationality operators, or the kinds of alternatives to evolutionary game theory discussed below. Nor is there discussion of semicoordinate transformations and their relation to cooperative game theory.
Finally, it's important to note that PD theory also has many applications in science beyond those considered in this paper. For example, see [21, 22, 36, 37, 38] for work relating the maxent Lagrangian to distributed control and to distributed optimization. See [37] for algorithms for speeding up convergence to bounded rational equilibria. Some of those algorithms are related to simulated and deterministic annealing [27] . In [20] others of those algorithms are related to Stackelberg games, and more generally to the problem of finding the optimal control hierarchy for team of players with a common goal, i.e., finding an optimal organization chart. See also [39, 40, 41] for work showing, respectively, how to use PD theory to improve Metropolis-Hastings sampling, how to relate it to the mechanism design work in [30, 31, 32, 33] , and how to extend it to continuous move spaces and timeextended strategies.
II. PD THEORY AS BOUNDED RATIONAL NONCOOPERATIVE GAME THEORY
This section motivates PD theory as a way of addressing several of the shortcomings of conventional noncooperative game theory.
A. Review of noncooperative game theory
In noncooperative game theory one has a set of N players. Each player i has its own set of allowed pure strategies. A mixed strategy is a distribution q i (x i ) over player i's possible pure strategies. Each player i also has a utility function g i that maps the pure strategies adopted by all N of the players into the real numbers.
So given mixed strategies of all the players, the expected utility of player i is E(
This basic framework can be elaborated to model many interactions between biological organisms, and in particular between human beings. These interactions range from simple abstractions like the famous prisoner's dilemma to iterated games like chess, to international relations [3, 4, 42] .
Much of noncooperative game theory is concerned with equilibrium concepts specifying what joint-strategy one should expect to result from a particular game. In particular, in a Nash equilibrium every player adopts the mixed strategy that maximizes its expected utility, given the mixed strategies of the other players. More formally, ∀i,
Several very rich fields have benefited from a close relationship with noncooperative game theory. Particular examples are evolutionary game theory (in which the set of N players is replaced by an infinite set of reproducing organisms) and cooperative game theory (in which players choose which coalitions of other players to join) [6, 43] . Game theory as a whole is also closely related to economics, in particular the field of mechanism design, which is concerned with how to induce the set of players to do adopt a socially desirable joint-strategy [3, 44, 45, 46] .
B. Problems with conventional noncooperative game theory
A number of objections to the Nash equilibrium concept have been resolved. In particular, it was Nash who proved that every game has at least one Nash equilibrium if one expands the realm of discourse to include mixed strategies. (The same is not true for pure strategies.) Other objections have been more or less resolved through numerous refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept.
However there are several major problems with the concept that are still outstanding. One of them is the possible multiplicity of equilibria; this multiplicity means the Nash equilibrium concept cannot be used to specify the joint strategy that is actually adopted in a real world game. (Some refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept attempt to address this problem, though none has succeeded.) Another problem is that while calculating Nash equilibria is straightforward in many simple games (e.g., 2 players in a zero-sum game), calculating them in the general case can be a very difficult computational multi-criteria optimization problem. Yet another problem is that there is no general way to extend the concept to allow each player to have multiple utility functions.
However perhaps the major problem with the Nash equilibrium concept is its assumption of full rationality. This is the assumption that every player i can both calculate what the strategies q j =i will be and then calculate its associated optimal distribution. In other words, it is the assumption that every player will calculate the entire joint distribution q(x) = j q j (x j ). If for no other reasons than computational limitations of real humans, this assumption is essentially untenable. This problem is just as severe if one allows statistical coupling among the players [3, 47] .
A large body of empirical lore has been generated characterizing the bounded rationality of humans. Similarly much has been learned about the empirical behavior of (bounded rational) machine learning computer algorithms playing games with one another [7, 13] . None of this work has resulted in a full mathematical theory of bounded rationality however.
There have also been numerous theoretical attempts to incorporate bounded rationality into noncooperative game theory by modifying the Nash equilibrium concept. Some of them assume essentially that every player's mixed strategy is its Nash-optimal strategy with some form of noise superimposed [6] . Others explicitly model the humans, typically as computationally limited automata, and assume the automata perform optimally subject to those computational limitations [10] . Both approaches, while providing insight, are very ad hoc as models of games involving real-world organisms or realworld (i.e., non-trivial) machine learning algorithms.
The difficulty of calculating equilibria is addressed in the sections below on solving for the distributions of PD theory. The rest of this section shows how information theory can be used to extend game theory to avoid its other shortcomings. Finally, the sections after this one present some other extensions of game theory, in particular to allow for a variable number of players. (Games with variable number of players arise in many biological scenarios as well as economic ones.) C. Review of the maximum entropy principle Shannon was the first person to realize that based on any of several separate sets of very simple desiderata, there is a unique real-valued quantification of the amount of syntactic information in a distribution P (y). He showed that this amount of information is (the negative of) the Shannon entropy of that distribution, S(P ) = − dy P (y)ln[
So for example, the distribution with minimal information is the one that doesn't distinguish at all between the various y, i.e., the uniform distribution. Conversely, the most informative distribution is the one that specifies a single possible y. Note that for a product distribution, entropy is additive, i.e., S( i q i (y i )) = i S(q i ).
Say we given some incomplete prior knowledge about a distribution P (y). How should one estimate P (y) based on that prior knowledge? Shannon's result tells us how to do that in the most conservative way: have your estimate of P (y) contain the minimal amount of extra information beyond that already contained in the prior knowledge about P (y). Intuitively, this can be viewed as a version of Occam's razor. This approach is called the maximum entropy (maxent) principle. It has proven extremely useful in domains ranging from signal processing to image processing to supervised learning [17] .
D. Maxent Lagrangians
Much of the work on equilibrium concepts in game theory adopts the perspective of an external observer of a game. We are told something concerning the game, e.g., its utility functions, information sets, etc., and from that wish to predict what joint strategy will be followed by real-world players of the game. Say that in addition to such information, we are told the expected utilities of the players. What is our best estimate of the distribution q that generated those expected utility values? By the maxent principle, it is the distribution with maximal entropy, subject to those expectation values.
To formalize this, for simplicity assume a finite number of players and of possible strategies for each player. To agree with the convention in other fields, from now on we implicitly flip the sign of each g i so that the associated player i wants to minimize that function rather than maximize it. Intuitively, this flipped g i (x) is the "cost" to player i when the joint-strategy is x, rather than its utility then.
Then for prior knowledge that the expected utilities of the players are given by the set of values {ǫ i }, the maxent estimate of the associated q is given by the minimizer of the Lagrangian
where the subscript on the expectation value indicates that it evaluated under distribution q, and the {β i } are Lagrange parameters implicitly set by the constraints on the expected utilities [50] .
Solving, we find that the mixed strategies minimizing the Lagrangian are related to each other via
where the overall proportionality constant for each i is set by normalization, and G ≡ i β i g i , and the subscript q (i) on the expectation value indicates that it is evaluated according the distribution j =i q j . In Eq. 2 the probability of player i choosing pure strategy x i depends on the effect of that choice on the utilities of the other players. This reflects the fact that our prior knowledge concerns all the players equally.
If we wish to focus only on the behavior of player i, it is appropriate to modify our prior knowledge. To see how to do this, first consider the case of maximal prior knowledge, in which we know the actual joint-strategy of the players, and therefore all of their expected costs. For this case, trivially, the maxent principle says we should "estimate" q as that joint-strategy (it being the q with maximal entropy that is consistent with our prior knowledge). The same conclusion holds if our prior knowledge also includes the expected cost of player i. Now modify this maximal set of prior knowledge by removing from it specification of player i's strategy. So our prior knowledge is the mixed strategies of all players other than i, together with player i's expected cost. We can incorporate the prior knowledge of the other players' mixed strategies directly into our Lagrangian, without introducing Lagrange parameters. That maxent Lagrangian is
with solution given by a set of coupled Boltzmann distributions:
Following Nash, we can use Brouwer's fixed point theorem to establish that for any non-negative values {β}, there must exist at least one product distribution given by the product of these Boltzmann distributions (one term in the product for each i). The first term in L i is minimized by a perfectly rational player. The second term is minimized by a perfectly irrational player, i.e., by a perfectly uniform mixed strategy q i . So β i in the maxent Lagrangian explicitly specifies the balance between the rational and irrational behavior of the player. In particular, for β → ∞, by minimizing the Lagrangians we recover the Nash equilibria of the game. More formally, in that limit the set of q that simultaneously minimize the Lagrangians is the same as the set of delta functions about the Nash equilibria of the game. The same is true for Eq. 2.
Eq. 2 is just a special case of Eq. 3, where all player's share the same cost function G. (Such games are known as team games.) This relationship reflects the fact that for this case, the difference between the maxent Lagrangian and the one in Eq. 1 is independent of q i . Due to this relationship, our guarantee of the existence of a solution to the set of maxent Lagrangians implies the existence of a solution of the form Eq. 2.
Typically players aren't close to perfectly selfdefeating. Almost always they will be closer to minimizing their expected cost than maximizing it. For prior knowledge consistent with such a case, the β i are all nonnegative.
Finally, our prior knowledge often will not consist of exact specification of the expected costs of the players, even if that knowledge arises from watching the players make their moves. Such other kinds of prior knowledge are addressed in several of the following subsections.
E. Alternative interpretations of Lagrangians
There are numerous alternative interpretations of these results. For example, change our prior knowledge to be the entropy of each player i's strategy, i.e., how unsure it is of what move to make. Now we cannot use information theory to make our estimate of q. Given that players try to minimize expected cost, a reasonable alternative is to predict that each player i's expected cost will be as small as possible, subject to that provided value of the entropy and the other players' strategies. The associated Lagrangians are
where σ i is the provided entropy value. This is equivalent to the maxent Lagrangian, and in particular has the same solution, Eq. 3.
Another alternative interpretation involves world cost functions, which are quantifications of the quality of a joint pure strategy x from the point of view of an external observer (e.g., a system designer, the government, an auctioneer, etc.). A particular class of world cost functions are "social welfare functions", which can be expressed in terms of the cost functions of the individual players. Perhaps the simplest example is G(x) = i β i g i (x), where the β i serve to trade off how much we value one player's cost vs. anothers. If we know the value of this social welfare function, but nothing else, then maxent tells us to minimize the Lagrangian of Eq. 1.
F. Bounded rational game theory
In many situations we have prior knowledge different from (or in addition to) expected values of cost functions. This is particularly true when the players are human beings (so that behavioral economics studies can be brought to bear) or simple computational algorithms. To apply information theory in such situations, we simply need to incorporate that prior knowledge into our Lagrangian(s).
To give a simple example, say that we know that the players all want to ensure not just a low expected cost, but also that the actual cost doesn't vary too much from one sample of q to the next. We can formalize this by saying that in addition to expected costs, our prior knowledge includes variances in the costs. Given the expected values of the costs, such variances are specified by the expected values of the squares of the cost. Accordingly, all our prior knowledge is in the form of expectation values. Modifying Eq. 3 appropriately, we arrive at the solution
where the Lagrange parameters α i and λ i are given by the provided expectations and variances of the costs of the players.
Eq. 4 is our best guess for what the actual mixed strategy of player i is, in light of our prior knowledge concerning that player. Note that this formula directly reflects the fact that player i does not care only about minimizing cost, i.e., maximizing utility. In this, we are directly incorporating the possibility that the player violates the axioms of utility theory -something never allowed in conventional game theory. Other behavioral economics phenomena like risk aversion can be treated in a similar fashion.
A variant of this scenario would have our prior knowledge only give the variances of the costs of the players and not their expected costs. In this cost the Lagrangian must involve a term quadratic in q, in addition to the entropy term and a term linear in q. (See the subsection on multiple cost functions.) More generally, our prior knowledge can be any nonlinear function of q. In addition, even if we stick to prior knowledge that is linear in q, that knowledge can couple the cost functions of the players. For example, if we know that the expected difference in cost of players i and j is ǫ, the associated Lagrange
In this situation our prior knowledge couples the strategies of the players, even though those players are independent. See the discussion on constrained optimization in Sec. Opt.
G. Cost of computation
As mentioned above, bounded rationality is an unavoidable consequence of the cost of computation to player i of finding its optimal strategy. Unfortunately, one cannot simply incorporate that cost into g i , and then presume that the player acts perfectly rationally for this new g i . The reason is that this cost is associated with the entire distribution q i (x i ) that player i calculates; it not associated with some particular joint-strategy formed by sampling such a distribution.
How might we quantify the cost of calculating q i ? The natural approach is to use information theory. Indeed, that cost arises naturally in the bounded rationality formulation of game theory presented above. To see how, for each player i define
Then we can write the maxent Lagrangian for player i as
Now in a bounded rational game every player sets its strategy to minimize its Lagrangian, given the strategies of the other players. In light of Eq. 4, this means that we can interpret each player in a bounded rational game as being perfectly rational for a cost function that incorporates its computational cost. To do so we simply need to expand the domain of "cost functions" to include probability values as well as joint moves. Similar results hold for non-maxent Lagrangians. All that's needed is that we can write such a Lagrangian in the form of Eq. 4 for some appropriate function f i .
H. Multiple cost functions per player
Say player i has several different cost functions {g j i } and wants to choose a strategy that will do well at all of them. In the case of pure strategies we can simply define an aggregate function like max j g
2 , and employ that in a conventional, single-cost-function-perplayer game theoretic analysis. Player i will perform well according to such a function iff it performs well according to all of the constituent g j i .
One might think that for mixed strategies one could just "roll up" the cost functions and say that player i works to minimize an aggregate cost function j g j i j 1 . However especially when player i has many cost functions, it may be that performance according to one or more of the constituent cost functions is quite bad even though the performance according to this average function is good. Similarly, player i can have a low value of the expectation of the minimum of its cost functions, even though the minimum of the expected costs is quite high. More generally, we cannot ensure that
) has a good value for all j by appropriately defining an aggregate g i . Instead, we must "redefine" expected cost.
We can address this by modifying our goals, in analogy with the goals typically ascribed to players playing pure strategies. We do this by having the choice of cost function for player i be controlled by a fictional player. For example, conventional game theory analyzes the case where player i chooses a pure strategy to minimize the worst case (over other players' moves) cost to i, i.e., to minimize max
Here the analogy would be for the player to choose a mixed strategy to minimize the worst case (over moves by the fictional player) expected cost, i.e., to minimize max j E q (g j i ). A similar choice, appropriate when the cost functions are all positive-definite, is for player i to minimize
[51] Formally, such functions are just Lagrangians of q. If we wish, we can modify them to incorporate bounded rationality, getting Lagrangians like
, where the β j determine the relative rationalities of player i according to its various cost functions.
These kinds of Lagrangians can also model the process of mechanism design, where there is an external designer who induces the players to adopt a desirable joint-strategy [3] . As an example, "desirable" sometimes means that no single player's expected cost is high. A system that meets this goal fairly well can be modeled with a Lagrangian involving terms like i [E q (g i )]
2 .
I. Shape of the Lagrangian surface
To analyze the shape of the Lagrangian, we start with the following lemma, which extends the technique of Lagrange parameters to off-equilibrium points:
Lemma 1: Consider the set of all vectors leading from x ′ ∈ R n that are, to first order, consistent with a set of constraints over R n . Of those vectors, the one giving the steepest ascent of a function V (x) is u = ∇V + i λ i ∇f i , up to an overall proportionality constant, where the λ i enforce the first order consistency conditions, u · ∇f i = 0 ∀i. This lemma can be used to establish that at the edge of Q, the space of all product distributions q, the steepest descent direction of any player's Lagrangian points into the interior of Q (assuming finite β and {g i }). Accordingly, whereas Nash equilibria can be on the edge of Q (e.g., for a pure strategy Nash equilibrium), in bounded rational games any equilibrium must lie in the interior of Q. In other words, any equilibrium (i.e., any local minimum) of a bounded rational game has non-zero probability for all joint moves. So we never have to consider extremal mixed strategies in searching for equilibria.
Lemma 1 can also be used to construct examples of games with more than one bounded rational equilibrium (just like there are games with more than Nash equilibrium). One can also show that for every player i and any point q interior to Q, there are directions in Q along which i's Lagrangian is locally convex. Accordingly, no player's Lagrangian has a local maximum interior to Q. So if there are multiple local minima of i's Lagrangian, they are separated by saddle points across ridges. Similarly, the uniform q is a solution to the set of coupled equations Eq. 3 for a team game, but typically is not a local minimum, and therefore must be a saddle point.
Say we modify the Lagrangians to be defined for all possible p, not just those that are product distributions. For example the Lagrangian of Eq. 1 becomes
The first term in this Lagrangian is linear in p. Since entropy is a concave function of the Euclidean vector p over the unit simplex, this means that the overall Lagrangian is a convex function of p over the space of allowed p. This means there is a unique minimum of the Lagrangian over the space of all possible legal p. Furthermore, as mentioned previously, for finite β at least one of the derivatives of the Lagrangian is negative infinite at the border of the allowed region of p. This means that the unique minimum of the Lagrangian is interior to that region, i.e., is a legal probability distribution.
In general this optimal p will not be a product distribution, of course. Rather the strategy choices of the players are typically statistically coupled, under this p. Such coupling is very suggestive of various stochastic formulations of noncooperative game theory. Coupling also arises in cooperative game theory, in which binding contracts couple the moves of the players [6, 42] .
Similarly, as in proven in the appendix, the Lagrangian
2 − S(p) is convex over the manifold of legal p, assuming non-negative β. So the model of mechanism design introduced in Sec. II H has a unique equilibrium -if we allow the players to be statistically coupled.
J. Rationality operators
Often our prior knowledge will not concern expected costs. In particular, this is usually true if our prior knowledge is provided to us before the game is played, rather than afterward. In such a situation, prior knowledge will more likely concern the "intelligences" of the players, i.e., how close they are to being rational. In particular, if we want our prior knowledge concerning player i to be relatively independent of what the other players do, we cannot use i's expected cost as our prior knowledge. Our prior knowledge will often concern how peaked i's mixed strategy is about whichever of its moves minimize its cost (or how peaked we can assume it to be), not the associated minimal cost values.
Formally, the problem faced by player i is how to set its mixed strategy q i (x i ) so as to maximize the expected value of its effective cost function, E(g i | x i ). Generalizing, what we want is a rationality operator R(U, p) that measures how peaked an arbitrary distribution p(y) is about the minimizers of an arbitrary cost function U (y), argminyU (y).
Formally, we make two requirements of R:
1. If p(y) ∝ e −βU(y) , for non-negative β, then it is natural to require that the peakedness of the distribution -its rationality value -is β.
2. We also need to also specify something of R(U, p)'s behavior for non-Boltzmann p. It will suffice to require that of the p satisfying R(U, p) = β, the one that has maximal entropy is proportional to e −βU(y) . In other words, we require that the Boltzmann distribution maximizes entropy subject to a provided value of the rationality operator.
As an illustration, a natural choice for R(U, p) would be the β of the Boltzmann distribution that "best fits" p.
Information theory provides us such a measure for how well a distribution p 1 is fit by a distribution p 2 . This is the Kullback-Leibler distance [16, 27] :
where
] is known as the cross entropy from p 1 to p 2 (and as usual we implicitly choose uniform µ). The KL distance is always non-negative, and equals zero iff its two arguments are identical.
Define N (U ) ≡ dy e −U(y) , the normalization constant for the distribution proportional to e −U(y) . (This is called the partition function in statistical physics.) Then using the KL distance, we arrive at the rationality operator
In the appendix it is proven that R KL respects the two requirements of rationality operators. The quantity ln(N (βU )) appearing in the second equation, when scaled by β −1 , is called the free energy. It is easy to verify that it equals the Lagrangian E p (U ) − S(p)/β if p is given by the Boltzmann distribution p(y) ∝ e −βU(y) . Say our prior knowledge is {ρ i }, the rationalities of the players for their associated effective cost functions. Introduce the general notation
where the λ i are the Lagrange parameters. Just as before, there is an alternative way to motivate this Lagangian: if our prior knowledge consists of the entropy of the joint system, and we assume each player will have maximal rationality subject to that prior knowledge, we are led to the Lagrangian of Eq. 6. It is shown in the appendix that for the KullbackLeibler rationality operator, we can replace any constraint of the form R( x (i) ). In other words, knowing that player i has KL rationality ρ i is equivalent to knowing that the actual expected value of g i equals the "ideal expected value", where q i is replaced by the Boltzmann distribution of Eq. 3 with β = ρ i . This contrasts with the prior knowledge underlying the Lagrangian in Eq. 1, in which we know the actual numerical value of E q (g i ).
Just as before, we can focus on player i by augmenting our prior knowledge to include the strategies of all the other players. The associated Lagrangian is
(The prior knowledge concerning the strategies of the other players is manifested in the effective cost function.) It is shown in the appendix that the set of all the Lagrangians in Eq. 7 (one for each player) are minimized simultaneously by any distribution of the form
In addition, since this distribution obeys all the constraints in the Lagrangian in Eq. 6, we know that there exists a minimizer of that Lagrangian. All of this holds regardless of the precise rationality operator one uses. Note that the Lagrangian L i of Eq. 7 for player i arises in response to prior knowledge specific to player i. Changing from one player and its Lagrangian to another changes the prior knowledge. (The same is true for the Lagrangians in Eq. 3.) In contrast, the Lagrangian of Eq. 6 arises for a single unified body of prior knowledge, namely the set of all players' rationalities.
For that single body of knowledge, the equilibrium of the game is the solution to a single-objective optimization problem. This contrasts with the conventional formulation of full rationality game theory, where the equilibrium is cast as a solution to a multi-objective optimization problem (one objective per player). Furthermore, for finite β, at least one of the derivatives of the Lagrangian is negative infinite at the border of the allowed region of product distributions (i.e., at the border of the Cartesian product of unit simplices). Accordingly, all solutions lie in the interior of that region. This can be a big advantage for finding such solutions numerically, as elaborated below.
K. Semi-coordinate systems
Consider a multi-stage game like chess, with the stages (i.e., the instants at which one of the players makes a move) delineated by t. Now strategies are what are set by the players before play starts. So in such a multi-stage game the strategy of player i, x i , must be the set of tindexed maps taking what that player has observed in the stages t ′ < t into its move at stage t. Formally, this set of maps is called player i's normal form strategy.
The joint strategy of the two players in chess sets their joint move-sequence, though in general the reverse need not be true. In addition, one can always find a joint strategy to result in any particular joint move-sequence. More generally, any onto mapping ζ : x → z, not necessarily invertible, is called a semi-coordinate system. The identity mapping z → z is a trivial example of a semi-coordinate system. Another example is the mapping from joint-strategies in a multi-stage game to joint move-sequences is an example of a semi-coordinate system. So changing the representation space of a multistage game from move-sequences z to strategies x is a semi-coordinate transformation of that game.
Typically there is overlap in what the players in chess have observed at stages preceding the current one. This means that even if the players' strategies are statistically independent, their move sequences are statistically coupled. In such a situation, by parameterizing the space of joint-move-sequences z with joint-strategies x, we shift our focus from the coupled distribution P (z) to the decoupled product distribution, q(x). This is the advantage of casting multi-stage games in terms of normal form strategies.
We can perform a semi-coordinate transformation even in a single-stage game. Say we restrict attention to distributions over spaces of possible x that are product distributions. Then changing ζ(.) from the identity map to some other function means that the players are no longer independent. After the transformation their strategy choices -the components of z -are statistically coupled, even though we are considering a product distribution. Formally, this is expressed via the standard rule for transforming probabilities,
where ζ(.) is the mapping from x to z, and P x and P z are the distributions across x-space and z-space, respectively. To see what this rule means geometrically, let P be the space of all distributions (product or otherwise) over z's.
Recall that Q is the space of all product distributions over x, and let ζ(Q) be the image of Q in P. Then by changing ζ(.), we change that image; different choices of ζ(.) will result in different manifolds ζ(Q).
As an example, say we have two players, with two possible strategies each. So z consists of the possible joint strategies, labeled (1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1) and (2, 2). Have the space of possible x equal the space of possible z, and choose ζ(1, 1) = (1, 1), ζ(1, 2) = (2, 2), ζ(2, 1) = (2, 1), and ζ(2, 2) = (1, 2). Say that q is given by q 1 (x 1 = 1) = q 2 (x 2 = 1) = 2/3. Then the distribution over joint-strategies z is P z (1, 1) = P x (1, 1) = 4/9, P z (2, 1) = P z (2, 2) = 2/9, P z (1, 2) = 1/9. So P z (z) = P z (z 1 )P z (z 2 ); the strategies of the players are statistically coupled.
Such coupling of the players' strategies can be viewed as a manifestation of sets of potential binding contracts. To illustrate this return to our two player example. Each possible value of a component x i determines a pair of possible joint strategies. For example, setting x 1 = 1 means the possible joint strategies are (1, 1) and (2, 2). Accordingly such a value of x i can be viewed as a set of proffered binding contracts. The value of the other components of x determines which contract is accepted; it is the intersection of the proffered contracts offered by all the components of x that determines what single contract is selected. Continuing with our example, given that x 1 = 1, whether the joint-strategy is (1, 1) or (2, 2) (the two options offered by x 1 ) is determined by the value of x 2 .
Binding contracts are a central component of cooperative game theory. In this sense, semi-coordinate transformations can be viewed as a way to convert noncooperative game theory into a form of cooperative game theory.
While the distribution over x uniquely sets the distribution over z, the reverse is not true. However so long as our Lagrangian directly concerns the distribution over x rather than the distribution over z, by minimizing that Lagrangian we set a distribution over z. In this way we can minimize a Lagrangian involving product distributions, even though the associated distribution in the ultimate space of interest is not a product distribution. The Lagrangian we choose over x should depend on our prior information, as usual. If we want that Lagrangian to include an expected value over z's (e.g., of a cost function), we can directly incorporate that expectation value into the Lagrangian over x's, since expected values in x and z are identical: dzP z (z)A(z) = dxP x (x)A(ζ(x)) for any function A(z). (Indeed, this is the standard justification of the rule for transforming probabilities, Eq. 8.)
However other functionals of probability distributions can differ between the two spaces. This is especially common when ζ(.) is not invertible, so the space of possible x is larger than the space of possible z. For example, in general the entropy of a q ∈ Q will differ from that of its image, ζ(q) ∈ ζ(Q) in such a case. (The prior probability µ in the definition of entropy only gives us invariance when the two spaces have the same cardinality.) A correction factor is necessary to relate the two entropies.
In such cases, we have to be careful about which space we use to formulate our Lagrangian. If we use the transformation ζ(.) as a tool to allow us to analyze bargaining games with binding contracts, then the direct space of interest is actually the x's (that is the place in which the players make their bargaining moves). In such cases it makes sense to apply all the analysis of the preceding sections exactly as it is written, concerning Lagrangians and distributions over x rather than z (so long as we redefine cost functions to implicitly pre-apply the mapping ζ(.) to their arguments). However if we instead use ζ(.) simply as a way of establishing statistical dependencies among the strategies of the players, it may make sense to include the entropy correction factor in our x-space Lagrangian.
An important special case is where the following three conditions are met: Each point z is the image under ζ(.) of the same number of points in x-space, n; µ(x) is uniform (and therefore so is µ(z)); and the Lagrangian in x-space, L x , is a sum of expected costs and the entropy. In this situation, consider a z-space Lagrangian, L z , whose functional dependence on P z , the distribution over z's, is identical to the dependence of L x on P x , except that the entropy term is divided by n [52]. Now the minimizer P * (x) of L x is a Boltzmann distribution in values of the cost function(s). Accordingly, for any z, P * (x) is uniform across all n points x ∈ ζ −1 (z) (all such x have the same cost value(s)). This in turn means that S(ζ(P x )) = nS(P z ) So our two Lagrangians give the same solution, i.e., the "correction factor" for the entropy term is just multiplication by n.
L. Entropic prior game theory
Finally, it is worth noting that in the real world the information we are provided concerning the system often will not consist of exact values of functionals of q, be those values expected costs, rationalities, or what have you.
Rather that knowledge will be in the form of data, D, together with an associated likelihood function over the space of q. For example, that knowledge might consist of a bias toward particular rationality values, rather than precisely specified values:
where α sets the strength of the bias.
The extension of the maximum entropy principle to such situations uses the entropic prior, P (q) ∝ e −γS(q) . Bayes' theorem is then invoked to get the posterior distribution [18] :
The Bayes optimal estimate for q, under a quadratic penalty term, is then given by E(q | D). The maxent principle for estimating q is given by this estimate under the limit of all α i going to infinity. For finite α solving for E(q | D) can be quite complicated though. For simplicity, such cases are not considered here.
III. PD THEORY AND STATISTICAL PHYSICS
There are many connections between bounded rational game theory -PD theory -and statistical physics. This should not be too surprising, given that many of the important concepts in bounded rational game theory, like the Boltzmann distribution, the partition function, and free energy, were first explored in statistical physics. This section discusses some of these connections.
A. Background on statistical physics
Statistical physics is the physics of systems about which we have incomplete information. An example is knowing only the expected value of a system's energy (i.e., its temperature) rather than the precise value of the energy. The statistical physics of such systems is known as the canonical ensemble. Another example is the grand canonical ensemble (GCE). There the number of particles of various types in the system is also uncertain. As in the canonical ensemble, in the GCE what knowledge we do have takes the form of expectation values of the quantities about which we are uncertain, i.e., the number of particles of the various types that the system contains, and the energy the system.
Traditionally these kinds of ensembles were analyzed in terms of "baths" of the uncertain variable that are connected to the system. For example, in the canonical ensemble the system is connected to a heat bath. In the GCE the system is also connected to a bath of particles of the various types.
Such analysis showed that for the canonical ensemble the probability of the system being in the particular state x is given by the Boltzmann distribution over the associated value of the system's energy, G(x), with β interpreted as the (inverse) temperature of the system: p(x) ∝ e −βG(x) . This result is independent of the details characteristics of the physical system; all that is important is the Hamiltonian G(x), and temperature β.
Note that once one knows p(x) and G(x), one knows the expected energy of the system. It is G(x) that is a fixed property of the system, whereas β can vary. Accordingly, specifying β is exactly equivalent to specifying the expected energy of the system.
In the case of the GCE, x implicitly specifies the number of particles of the various types, as well as their precise state. The analysis for that case showed that p(x) ∝ e −βG(x)− i µini . In this formula β is again the inverse temperature, n i is the number of particles of type i, and µ i > 0 is the chemical potential of each particle of type i.
Jaynes was the first to show that these results of conventional statistical physics could be derived without recourse to artificial notions like "baths", simply by using the maxent principle. In particular, he used the exact reasoning in Sec. II F to derive the fact that the canonical ensemble is governed by the Boltzmann distribution.
B. Mean field theory and PD theory
In practice it can be quite difficult to evaluate this Boltzmann distribution, due to difficulty in evaluating the partition function. For example, in a spin glass, x is an N -dimensional vector of bits, one per particle, and G(x) = i,j H i,j x i x j . So the partition function is given by dxe − i,j Hi,j xixj , where H is a symmetric real-valued matrix, and as before we use to indicate the integral according to the appropriate measure (here a point-sum measure). In general, evaluating this sum for large numbers of spins cannot be done in closed form.
Mean Field (MF) theory is a technique for getting around this problem by approximating the partition function. Intuitively, it works by treating all the particles as independent. It does this by replacing some of the values of the state of a particle in the Hamiltonian by its average state. For example, in the case of the spin glass,
where the expectation values are evaluated according to the associated exact Boltzmann distribution, i.e., one assumes that fluctuations about the means are relatively negligible. This then means that
The second sum in this approximation cancels out when we evaluate the associated approximate Boltzmann distribution, leaving us with the distribution
This approximation P βU (x) is far easier to work with than the exact Boltzmann distribution,
N (βU) , since each term in the product is for a single spin by itself. In particular, if we adopt this approximation we can use numerical techniques to solve the associated set of simultaneous equations
for the E(x i ) (so that those E(x i ) are no longer exactly equal to the expected values of the {x i } under the distribution p βU (x)). Given those E(x i ) values, we can then evaluate the associated approximate Boltzmann distribution explicitly.
The mean field approximation to the Boltzmann distribution is a product distribution, and in fact is identical to the product distribution q g of bounded rational game theory, for the team game where g i (x) = 2βG(x) ∀i. Accordingly, the "mean field theory" approximation for an arbitrary Hamiltonian U can be taken to be the associated team game q g , which is defined for any U . This bridge between bounded rational game theory and statistical physics means that many of the powerful tools that have been developed in statistical physics can be applied to bounded rational game theory. They also mean that PD theoretic techniques can be applied in statistical physics. In particular, it is shown elsewhere [20, 21] that if one replaces the identical cost function of each player in a team game with different cost functions, then the bounded rational equilibrium of that game can be numerically found far more quickly. In the context of statistical physics, this means that numerically solving for a MF approximation may be expedited by assigning a different Hamiltonian to each particle.
C. Information-theoretic misfit measures
The proper way to approximate a target distribution p with a distribution from a set C is to first specify a misfit measure saying how well each member of C approximates p, and then solve for the member with the smallest misfit. This is just as true when C is the set of all product distributions as when it is any other set.
How best to measure distances between probability distributions is a topic of ongoing controversy and research [26] . The most common way to do so is with the infinite limit log likelihood of data being generated by one distribution but misattributed to have come from the other. This is know as the Kullback-Leibler distance [16, 17, 27] :
µ(x) ] is known as the cross entropy from p 1 to p 2 (and as usual we implicitly choose uniform µ). The KL distance is always nonnegative, and equals zero iff its two arguments are identical. However it it is far from being a metric. In addition to violating the triangle inequality, it is not symmetric under interchange of its arguments, and in numerical applications has a tendency to blow up. (That happens whenever the support of p 1 includes points outside the support of p 2 .) Nonetheless, this is by far the most popular measure. It is illuminating to use it as our misfit measure. As shorthand, define the "pq distance" as KL(p || q), and the "qp distance" as KL(q || p, where p is our target distribution and q is a product distribution. Then it is straightforward to show that the qp distance from q to target distribution p βU is just the maxent Lagrangian, up to irrelevant overall constants. In other words, the q minimizing the maxent Lagrangian -the distribution arising in MF theory -is the q with the minimal qp distance to the associated Boltzmann distribution.
However the qp distance is the (infinite limit of the negative log of) the likelihood that distribution p would attribute to data generated by distribution q. It can be argued that a better measure of how well q approximates p would be based on the likelihood that q attributes to data generated by p. This is the pq distance. Up to an overall additive constant (of the canonical distribution's entropy), the pq distance is
This is equivalent to a team game where each coordinate i has the "Lagrangian"
The minimizer of this is just q i = p i ∀i, i.e., each q i is set to the associated marginal distribution of p. So in particular, when our target distribution is the canonical ensemble distribution p βU , the optimal q according to pq distance is the set of marginals of p βU . Note that unlike the solution for qp distance, here the solution for each q i is independent of the q (i) . So we don't have a game theory scenario; we do not need to pay attention to the q (i) when estimating each separate q i . Correspondingly, whereas there are many local minima of the team game Lagrangian studied above, q ∈ Q → KL(q || p βU ), there is only one, global minimum of q ∈ Q → KL(p β || q).
Another difference between the two kinds of KL distance is how the associated optimal product distributions are typically calculated numerically. The product distribution that optimizes the maxent Lagrangian is usually found via derivative-based traversal of that Lagrangian, or techniques like (mixed) Brouwer updating [20, 21, 22, 23, 36] . In contrast, the integral giving each marginal distribution of p is usually found via adaptive importance sampling of the associated integral, with the proposal distribution for the integral to approximate p i set adaptively, as q (i) [20] .
It is possible to motivate yet other choices for the q that best approximates p βU . To derive one of them, start with Lemma 1, with R n set to the space of real-valued functions over the set of x's (so that n is the number of possible x). Have a single constraint f that restricts us to P, the unit simplex in R n , i.e., that restricts us to the set of functions that (assuming they are nowhere-negative) are probability distributions. Choose V to be the associated Lagrangian, L(p) = βE p (G) − S(p), p being a point in our constrained submanifold of R n . Note that this p can be any distribution over the x's, including one that couples the components {x i }.
Say we are at some current product distribution q. Then we can apply Lemma 1 with the choices just outlined to tell us what direction to move from q in P so as to reduce the Lagrangian. In general, taking a step in that direction will result in a distribution p ′ that is not a product distribution. However we can solve for the product distribution that is closest to that p ′ , and move to that product distribution. By iterating this procedure we can define a search over the submanifold of product distributions. We can then solve for the product distribution at which this search will terminate.
To do this, of course, we must define what we mean by "closest". Say that we choose to measure closeness by pq distance. Then the terminating production distribution is the one for which the marginals of ∇L + λ∇f all equal 0. For each i, this means that
at the equilibrium product distribution p. Writing out p = i q i and evaluating gives
This is akin to the q g of a bounded rational game, except that each player/particle i sets its distribution by evaluating conditional expected U with a uniform distribution over the x (i) , rather than with q (i) .
D. Semi-coordinate transformations
Let's say there are numerical difficulties with our finding a q that is local minimization of the maxent Lagrangian. That q might still be a poor fit to p(x) if it is far from the global minimizer of the Lagrangian. Furthermore, even the global minimizer might be a poor fit, if p(x) simply can't be well-approximated by a product distribution.
There are many techniques for improving the fit of a product distribution to a target distribution in machine learning and statistics [27] . To give a simple example, say one wishes to approximate the target distribution in R N with a product of Gaussians, one Gaussian for each coordinate. Even if the target distribution a Gaussian, if it is askew, then one won't be able to do a good job of approximating it with a product of Gaussians. However one can use Principal Components Analysis (PCA) to find how to rotate one's coordinates so that a product of Gaussians fits the target exactly.
Similar techniques can address both the issue of breaking free of local minima of the Lagrangian, and improving the accuracy of the best product distribution approximation to p. More precisely, identify x with the variables z discussed in Sec. II K. Then consider changing the map ζ(.) : x → z from the identity map. This will in general change the mapping from P x to L z (ζ(P x )). So if L z is the Lagrangian we are interested in, the mapping from product distributions over x can be changed by changing ζ(.), in general.
As an example, consider the case where the space of x's is identical to the space of z's, and consider all possible bijective transformations ζ(.). Entropy is the same in both spaces for any ζ, i.e., S(P z ) = S(ζ(P x )) = S(P x ). So for fixed P x , the entropy in z-space is independent of ζ(.). However if we fix P x and change ζ(.) the expected values of utilities will change. So L z (ζ(P x )) does depend on ζ(.), as claimed.
This means that by changing ζ(.) while leaving q x unchanged, we will in general change whether we are at a local minimum of L z (ζ(q x )). Furthermore, such a change will change how closely the global minimizer of L z (ζ(q x )) approximates any particular target distribution. Indeed, some such transformation will always transform a team game to have a strictly convex maxent Lagrangian, with only one (bounded rational) equilibrium, an equilibrium that is in the interior of the region of allowed q and that has the lowest possible value of the Lagrangian. In the worst case, we can get this behavior by transforming to the semi-coordinate system in which x is onedimensional, so that any p(z) -coupling its variables or not -can be expressed as a q(x) = q 1 (x 1 ).
Note that unlike with PCA, semi-coordinate transformations can be used for non-Euclidean semi-coordinates (i.e., when neither x's nor z's are Euclidean vectors). They also can be guided by numerous measures of the goodness of fit to the target distribution (e.g., KL distance), in contrast to PCA's restriction to assuming a Gaussian likelihood.
E. Bounded rational game theory for variable number of players
The bridge between statistical physics and bounded rational game theory have many uses beyond the practical ones alluded to the previous subsection. In particular, it suggests extending bounded rational game theory to ensembles other than the canonical ensemble. As an example, in the GCE the number of particles of the various allowed types is uncertain and can vary. The bounded rational game theory version of that ensemble is a game in which the number of players of various types can vary.
We can illustrate this by extending a simple instance of evolutionary game theory [6] to incorporate bounded rationality and allow for a finite total number of players. Say we have a finite population of players, each of which has one of m ′ possible types. (These are sometimes called feature vectors in the literature.) Each player i in the population is randomly paired with a different player j, and they each choose a strategy for a twoperson game. The set of strategies each of those players can choose among is fixed by its respective attribute vector. In addition the cost player i receives depends on the attribute vectors of itself and of j, in addition to their joint strategy. Finally, to reflect this dependence, we allow each player to vary its strategy depending on the attribute vector of its opponent; we call player i's metastrategy the mapping from its opponent's attribute vector to i's strategy. [53] .
We encode an instance of this scenario in an x with a countably infinite number of dimensions. x i,0 ≡ n i (x) specifies the number of players of type i, with n(x) being the vector of the number of players of all types. For 1 < j ≤ x i,0 , x i,j ≡ s i,j (x) the meta-strategy selected by the j'th player of type i. If its opponent is the j'th player of type T ′ , the cost to the i'th player of type
, where s and s ′ are the two players' respective meta-strategy. To enforce consistency between the index numbers i, j and the associated numbers of players, we set g
To start we parallel the GCE, and presume that for each type we know the expected number of players having that type, and the expected cost averaged over all players having that type. Also stipulate that the distribution over x is a product distribution, q. Then our prior information specifies the values of
and n:n T >0 q( n)
respectively, for all types T . (The sums over j and k all implicitly extend from 1 to ∞, and the delta functions are Kronecker deltas that prevent a player from playing itself.) We can write these expressions as expectation values, over x, of 2m ′ functions. These functions are the m ′ functions n T (x) = x T,0 (one function for each T ) and the m ′ functions
respectively, where Θ is the Heaviside theta function that equals 1 if its argument exceeds 0, and equals 0 otherwise. Accordingly, the maxent principle directs us to minimize the Lagrangian
where the integers {N T } and real numbers {C T } are our prior information. In the usual way, the solution for each pair (i ∈ {1, . . . , m ′ }, j ≥ 0) is
where the values of the Lagrange parameters are all set by our prior information. This distribution is analogous to the one in the GCE. As usual, one can consider variants of it by focusing on one variable at a time, having prior knowledge in the form of rationality values, etc. In addition, even if we stay in this random-2-player games scenario, there is no reason for us to restrict attention to prior information paralleling that of the GCE. As with bounded rational game theory with a fixed number of players, our prior information can concern nonlinear functions of q, couple the cost functions, etc.
In particular, in evolutionary game theory we do not know the expected number of players having each type, nor their average costs. In addition, the equilibrium concept stipulates that all players will have type T if a particular condition holds. That condition is that the addition of a player of type other than T to the population results in an expected cost to that added player that is greater than the associated expected cost to the players having type T . This provides a model of the phenotypic interactions underlying natural selection.
We can encapsulate evolutionary game theory in a Lagrangian by appropriately replacing each pair of GCEtype constraints (one pair for each type) with a single constraint. As an example, we could have the (single) constraint for type T be that
for some positive real value γ. For finite γ, the entropy term in the Lagrangian ensures that for no T is the expectation value in the lefthand side of this constraint exactly 0.
In the limit of infinite γ, the distribution minimizing this Lagrangian is non-infinitesimal only for the evolutionarily stable strategies of conventional evolutionary game theory. These are the (type, strategy) pairs that are best performing, in the sense that no other pair has a lower cost function value. The distribution for finite γ can be viewed as a "bounded rational" extension of conventional evolutionary game theory. In that extension (type, strategy) pairs are allowed even if they don't have the lowest possible cost, so long as their cost is close to the lowest possible [54] .
There is always a solution to this Lagrangian (unlike the case in conventional full rationality evolutionary game theory). The technique of Lagrange parameters provides that solution for each pair (i ∈ {1, . . . , m ′ }, j ≥ 0) in the usual way:
where the Lagrange parameters enforce our constraint, and
More general forms of evolutionary game theory allow games with more than two players, and localization via network structures delineating how players are likely to be grouped to play a game. Other elaborations have each player not know the exact attribute vectors of all its opponents, but only an "information structure" providing some information about those opponents' attribute vectors. All such extensions can be straightforwardly incorporated into the current analysis. Many other extensions are simple to make as well. For example, since the cost functions have all components of n in their argument lists, they can depend on the total size of the population. This allows us to model the effect on population size of finite environmental resources.
Note that if we change how we encode the number of players of the various types and their joint meta-strategy in x, we change the form of the expectations in Eq. 11. This reflects the fact that by changing the encoding we change the implication of using a product distribution. Formally, such a change in the encoding is a change in the semi-coordinate system. See Sec. II K.
IV. APPENDIX
This appendix provides proofs absent from the main text.
2 − S(p) is convex over the unit simplex
Proof: Since S(p) is concave over the unit simplex, and the unit simplex is a hyperplane, it suffices to prove
2 is convex over all of Euclidean space. Since a weighted average of convex functions is convex, we only need to prove that any single function of the form
2 is convex. The Hessian of this function is 2f (x)f (x ′ ). Rotate coordinates so that f is a basis vector, i.e., so that f is proportional to a delta function. This doesn't change the eigenvalues of the Hessian. After this change though, the Hessian is diagonal, with one non-zero entry on the diagonal, which is non-negative. So its eigenvalues are zero and a non-negative number. QED.
B. RKL is a rationality operator
Proof: Since KL distance only equals 0 when its arguments match and is never negative, requirement (1) of rationality operators holds for R KL . Next, since R KL = argmin β [β dy p(y)U (y) + ln(N (βU ))], we know that E p (U ) = − 1 N (βU) ∂N (βU) ∂β | β=RKL(U,p) . Accordingly, all p with the same rationality have the same expected value E p (U ). Using the technique of Lagrange parameters then readily establishes that of those distributions having the same expected U , the one with maximal entropy is a Boltzmann distribution. Furthermore, by requirement (1), we know that for a Boltzmann distribution the exponent β must equal the rationality of that distribution. QED. Proof: Following Nash, we can use Brouwer's fixed point theorem to establish that for any non-negative {ρ i }, there must exist at least one product distribution given by q g . The constraint term in all the L i of Eq. 7 is zero for this distribution. By requirement (2), we also know that given q g (i) (and therefore [g i ] i,q g ), there is no q i with rationality ρ i that has lower entropy than q g i . Accordingly, no q i will have a lower value of L i . Since this holds for all i, q g minimizes all the Lagrangians in Eq. 7 simultaneously. QED.
E. Derivation of Lemma 1
Proof: Consider the set of u such that the directional derivatives D u f i evaluated at x ′ all equal 0. These are the directions consistent with our constraints to first order. We need to find the one of those u such that D u g evaluated at x ′ is maximal. To simplify the analysis we introduce the constraint that | u| = 1. This means that the directional derivative D u V for any function V is just u · ∇V . We then use Lagrange parameters to solve our problem. Our constraints on u are j u λ 0 enforces our constraint on | u|. Since we are only interested in specifying u up to a proportionality constant, we can set 2λ 0 = 1. Redefining the Lagrange parameters by multiplying them by −1 then gives the result claimed. QED.
where the invariance of g i was used in the penultimate step. Since q is a local minimum though, this last difference must equal 0. Therefore q ′ is also a local minimum. Now choose the game so that ∀i, x i , T (x i ) = x i . (Our congestion game example has this property.) Then the only way the transformation q → q(T ) can avoiding producing a new product distribution is if q i (x i ) = q i (x ′ i ) ∀i, x i , x ′ i , i.e., q is uniform. Say the Hessians of the players' Lagrangians are not all positive definite at the uniform q. (For example have our congestion game be biased away from uniform multiplicities.) Then that q is not a local minimum of the Lagrangians. Therefore at a local minimum, q = q(T ). Accordingly, q and q(T ) are two distinct equilibria.
iii) To establish that at any q there is always a direction along which any player's Lagrangian is locally convex, fix all but two of the {q i }, q 0 and q 1 , and fix both q 0 and q 1 for all but two of their respective possible values, which we can write as q 0 (0), q 0 (1), q 1 (0), and q 1 (1), respectively. So we can parameterize the set of q we're considering by two real numbers, x ≡ q 0 (0) and y ≡ q 1 (0). The 2 × 2 Hessian of L i as a function of x and y has the entries The eigenvalue for the positive root is necessarily positive. Therefore along the corresponding eigenvector, L i is convex at q. QED.
[50] Throughout this paper the terms in any Lagrangian that restrict distributions to the unit simplices are implicit. The other constraint needed for a Euclidean vector to be a valid probability distribution is that none of its components are negative. This will not need to be explicitly enforced in the Lagrangian here.
[51] Note that due to the convexity of the squaring operator such minimization will help ensure that no single expectation value Eq(g j i ) is too high. Minimizing the expectation value dxq(x) j [g j i (x)] 2 will do a roughly similar thing, in that it will help ensure that q(x) is small where the individual gj (x) are large.
[52] For example, if Lx(Px) = βEP x (G(ζ(.))) − S(Px), then Lz(Pz) = βEP z (G(.)) − S(Pz)/n, where Px and Pz are related as in Eq. 8.
[53] Note that it is trivial to replace meta-strategies with strategies throughout the analysis below: simply restrict attention to meta-strategies that do not vary with the opponent's attribute vector [54] Many other parameterized constraints will result in this kind of relation between the parameter value and the resultant Lagrangian-minimizing distribution. The one in Eq. 11 was chosen simply for pedagogical clarity.
[55] As an example, consider a congestion team game in which all players have the same set of possible moves, G being a function only of the bit string indexed by k ∈ N, {N (x, k)}, where N (x, k) = 1 iff there is a move that is shared by exactly k of the players when the joint move is x. In this case T just permutes the set of possible moves in the same way for all players.
